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Abstract. 
 
This paper refers to a few recent studies, which have focused on methodological 
issues related to the estimation of the wage share variations, to compare the 
evolutions in France and former West Germany since 1970. It is shown that the usual 
method overestimates the long run drop of wage share in both countries but that the 
magnitude and thus the contribution of different biases are quite different in France 
and Germany. However no bias can explain the sharp drop of wage share in 
Germany since 2001, which has to be analysed within the framework of the euro 
area. 
 
JEL classification: C10, E60, J30. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of income distribution (between wages and profits) in developed 
countries since the beginning of the 1970s seems today well established. A lot of 
studies focused especially on countries of Continental Europe, where wage share 
variations have been very important for thirty years, whereas economic theory 
generally assumes that it should be nearly constant and stable over time. In these 
countries, wage share increased during the 1970s. Then it strongly decreased, so 
that wage share level at the beginning of twenty first century would be quite below its 
1970 level. 
For twenty years, many theoretical explanations have been brought to analyze the 
large fluctuations of wage share in these countries. A first set of contributions raised 
the usual hypothesis of an elasticity of substitution between factors equal to unity (as 
in the Cobb-Douglas production function). Indeed, if this elasticity is inferior to one, 
any increase of the relative price of a factor will increase the share of this factor in the 
 value-added. Thus, wage share push in the 1970s would result from the failure of 
wage to adjust to the slowdown of labour productivity growth (Bruno and Sachs, 
1985). Similarly, wage share drop in the 1980s would be due to the rise of real 
interest rates (see e.g. Cotis and Rignols, 1998, or Baghli, Cette and Sylvain, 2003). 
Caballero and Hammour (1997) assert that, whereas elasticity is inferior to one in the 
short-term, it is likely to be far superior to one in the medium-term, because adoption 
of new techniques in response to price evolutions takes time: thus the important 
increase of relative price of labour in the 1970s, which has initially brought about a 
wage share increase, would also explain its decrease in the 1980s. 
A second set of contributions (see e.g. Blanchard, 1997, or Blanchard and Giavazzi, 
2003) has analysed the income distribution variations in the framework of rent-
sharing models: imperfections on the goods market generate rents, that firms and 
unions try to capture afterwards. In this perspective wage share decrease can result 
either from a rise of rents (as imperfection on goods markets grows, which raises 
price level and eventually reduces real wages) or from a weaker bargaining power of 
unions to capture rent (which would be the main explanation of the large drop of 
wage share for twenty five years, according to these authors). 
At last, a third and more recent set of studies has focused on methodological issues 
related to the estimation of income distribution and challenged the analysis 
developed to date. These studies have underlined that usual method to calculate 
wage share was misleading and generated biases. On the one hand, De Serres, 
Scarpetta and Maisonneuve (2002) showed that evolutions in the sectoral structure 
of countries biased the wage share indicator; on the other hand, Askenazy (2003) 
exhibited another bias, related to the estimation of labour remuneration of 
unincorporated enterprises. 
In this paper, we refer directly to these two last works to compare wage share 
evolution in France and former West Germany since 1970. Indeed, the first 
contribution of our work is to focus on data of only former West Germany (before and 
after 1991), which allows to avoid many methodological issues – which will be 
presented in the core of the article – related to reunification. In a first step, we show 
that usual method does overestimate the drop of wage share in both countries but 
the magnitude and thus the contribution of each bias is quite different in France and 
Germany. Second, we focus more specifically on the bias highlighted by de Serres, 
Scarpetta and Maisonneuve: we decompose by sector the sectoral bias so as to 
show why it has been more important in Germany than in France. At last, we 
concentrate on the recent period, during which no bias can explain the sharp drop of 
wage share in Germany, und we interpret the noted evolution within the framework of 
the euro area. 
 
 
2. THE EVOLUTIONS OF WAGE SHARE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
SINCE 1970 
 
The usual method to estimate wage share is to divide total compensations of 
employees by nominal GDP. Nevertheless, this estimate generates a bias, because 
the part of employees in total employment has been increasing for several decades 
(at the expense of unincorporated enterprises, which strongly decreased in the same 
time) in the bulk of developed countries. The usual method to remove this bias 
consists in attributing to unincorporated enterprises owners the average 
compensation of wage earners as remuneration of their labour. Figure 1 displays this 
 adjusted wage share for Germany from 1970 to 2004 (as most of studies on German 
wage share, figure 1 displays data of West Germany before 1991 and data of 
reunified Germany thereafter)1. 
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Figure 1 Adjusted wage share in value added (at basic prices), 
France and Germany, 1970-2004
 
Concerning France, wage share increased a lot between 1970 and 1982 (+5.3 points 
of percentage). Nevertheless, the evolutions reversed in 1980s: the wage lost 8.1 
points of percentage from 1982 to 1990. In the 1990, the wage share kept decreasing 
but more slightly than the previous decades (-3.0 points between 1990 and 2003). 
Actually the wage share in 2003 is 5.8 points under its level of 1970. 
For Germany, we are faced with the problems relating to the reunification and its 
consequences on German data. From figure 1, we notice that reunification brings 
about a “leap” on German wage share: in 1991, the wage share equals 65.1 % in 
West Germany and 66.8 % in reunified Germany. So it is obvious that reunification 
had a significant impact on the indicator of wage share. 
 
 
2.1. Distinguishing former East and West Germany after 1991 
 
One important contribution of our paper is to focus on former West Germany before 
and after 1991. Indeed, data for former West Germany after 1991 can be obtained by 
using available data by Land for the period 1991-2004. Nevertheless, our data after 
1991 includes East Berlin in “former West Germany”; because the only data available 
after 1991 concerns the whole of the Land of Berlin and not West Berlin only. This 
approximation corresponds to a 0.7 % increase of value added in 1991, and the 

German national accounts very recently updated their national accounts by adopting the new 
treatment of FISIM (Financial intermediation services indirectly measured) proposed by the European 
System of Accounts 95 (ESA 95): the use of FISIM is not anymore by convention recorded entirely as 
intermediate consumption, but can also be final consumption. This new treatment of FISIM has a 
direct impact on the estimation of gross value-added. Data on figure 1 take this new treatment of 
FISIM into account. Nevertheless and unfortunately, available data on sole Former West Germany 
after 1991 just as data by industry (that we use afterwards in this article) have not been updated yet. 
So, in the rest of this article, the data we use were built on the basis of former SIFIM treatment (the 
use of FISIM is fully recorded as intermediate consumption). Concerning French data, we used data in 
“base 80” for the period1970-78 and in “base 95” for the rest of the period. Data in “base 2000”, 
adopting the new treatment for FISIM are today incomplete (especially data on employment).
 wage share is hardly affected by this discrepancy (less than 0.2 points of percentage 
in 1991).  
The reason which motivates our choice to focus on former West Germany is twofold. 
On the one hand, we get continuous time series between 1970 and 2004 and then 
remove the leap brought about by reunification. On the other hand, it allows us to 
distinguish the very contrasted evolutions of wage share in these two areas (East and 
West Germany) after 1991.  
 
2.2. The case of former East Germany 
 
East German wage share during the 1990 is characterized by two points: 
- First of all, the East-German wage share just before reunification was 
extremely high: more than 90% in 1991 (it is indeed this very high level, by 
comparison with West Germany, which explains the “leap” consecutive to 
reunification (see figure 1)). This can be easily explained by remembering that 
East-Germany was a socialist economy, so that return on capital was very 
weak (and consequently the wage share very important). 
- East Germany has experienced important economic evolutions since 1991 
with strong impact on income distribution: between 1991 and 2004, East-
German wage share collapsed and lost nearly 25 points of percentage. In 
2004, it eventually equals 67 %, which corresponds almost to the mean of the 
West German wage share between 1970 and 1991 (67.5%). 
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Figure 2 Adjusted wage share, Former East Germany, 1991-2004 
 
One explanation for this sharp decrease is that return on capital had to increase 
during transition into capitalist economy. But another and undoubtedly the most 
important explanation is that East Germany, which productivity was far weaker than 
that of West Germany in 1991, has benefited from catching-up process. As figure 3 
emphasizes, East German labour productivity was only 43 % of West German 
productivity in 1991, 65 % in 1995 and around 75 % today. As catching-up usually 
rests on strong capital accumulation, it is likely to have increased the share of capital 
remuneration in value added. 
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Figure 3 Average labour productivity in Former East Germany divided 
by average labour productivity in former West Germany, 1991-2004 
 
 
2.3. Former West Germany 
 
As seen in the previous section, the impact of East German situation on the wage 
share of reunified Germany is twofold. On the one hand, the very high level of East 
German wage share explains the jump of 1.7 points observed in 1991 (see figure 1). 
On the other hand, the important fall of the East German wage share explains a part 
of the fall of the wage share of reunified Germany between 1991 and 2004: the 
decrease of the West German wage share is only of 2.0 points between 1991 and 
2004, against 3.0 points for reunified Germany (whereas the value added of the Ex-
GDR accounts for only 7 % of the value added of reunified Germany in 1991) 2. 
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Figure 4 Adjusted wage share, Former  
West Germany and France, 1970-2004 
 
In this article, we focus on West Germany (and not reunified Germany). Figure 4 
shows that West German wage share lost 5.8 points of percentage between 1970 
and 2004. The general impression given by this figure is that, for thirty years, West 
2
 Thus, one third of the decrease for reunified Germany between 1991 and 2004 is explained by the 
decrease in East-Germany 
 German wage share has experienced oscillations around a noticeable decreasing 
trend for thirty years.  
If we compare now France and West Germany, the two curves were approximately at 
the same level at the beginning of the 1970s. Although trajectories between 1973 
and the end of the 1980s are quite different, France experiencing both stronger 
increases and decreases, the wage shares of both countries seem to converge for 
fifteen years. Wage shares of both countries show a declining long term trend. 
Nevertheless, many recent studies highlighted that the method of calculation of the 
wage share presented hitherto generates decreasing biases which could explain the 
general evolution of both curves on figure 4 to a large extent. 
In the next section, we describe the biases related to the standard method of 
calculation of wage share. We then present the methods which allow to remove these 
biases and show eventually that these methodological corrections modify 
substantially the shape of wage share curves. 
 
 
3. HOW TO DEAL BETTER WITH THE UNINCORPORATED 
ENTERPRISES? 
 
Askenazy (2003) recently underlined that the method presented hitherto (where 
labour compensation of each unincorporated enterprises owner equals the 
compensation of the average employee) generates itself a bias, because average 
compensation is a very bad approximation of the income of unincorporated 
enterprises owners. Indeed, this method would overestimate their income in the 
1970s, when these non-employee workers were mainly farmers with low earnings. 
Symmetrically, this method would underestimate their income today, as a large part 
of these workers (doctors, lawyers…) earn much more than the average employee. A 
better estimate can easily be obtained by attributing to these workers the 
compensation of the average employee of their own activity branch (and not the 
national average compensation). Figure 5 displays former West German wage share 
calculated by this “Askenazy assessment”. Our data on former West Germany after 
1991 allows us to divide total economy into only 11 sectors (for which data on total 
employment, employees and labour compensations are available). Nevertheless, this 
calculation has been made over the period 1970-91 with decomposition into 11 as 
well as 30 sectors, with quite similar results (the gap between the two curves never 
exceeds 0.2 points of percentage and this gap remains constant over time). 
Conclusion drawn from figure 6 is that this correction has a rather weak effect on 
German wage share which looses 4.2 points between 1970 and 2002 with the usual 
assessment against 3.7 points with the Askenazy alternative method (the gap 
between the two curves equals 0.5 points in 2002)3. Thus, only 17 % of the German 
wage share decrease between 1970 and 2002 can be explained by the bias 
discovered by Askenazy (indeed, the rate of salaried workers in total employment 
was already very weak in 1970). 
In the French case on the contrary, the two calculations lead to quite different curves: 
the wage share as per the Askenazy method is almost 4 points above the usual 
wage share, so that the gap between 1970 and 2001 is not of 6 but of only 2 points. 
3
 To facilitate the comparison of the two curves, the same level has been attributed to the two curves 
in 1970 (this method of comparison is used in most of other figures of the paper). Actually, the wage 
share estimated by the Askenazy method is 1.3 points above the wage share estimated by the usual 
method in 1970.
 This correction is much more important for France than for Germany, especially since 
the agricultural population remained pretty large in 1970 in France, whereas it was 
already low in West Germany at the same time. 
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Figure 5 Adjusted Wage share in value added,  
two different methods of calculation: 
Former West Germany, 1970-2004 
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Figure 6 Adjusted Wage share in value added,  
two different methods of calculation: France, 1970-2001 
 
 
4. THE STRONG EFFECT OF A SECTORAL SHIFT BIAS 
 
Suppose an economy with only two sectors of activity A and B, each of them 
weighting 50 % of total value added. The wage share of sector A equals to 80 %, the 
wage share of B equals to 60 %, so that the national wage share equals to 70 %. 
Suppose now that the weight of sector B grows and reaches 60 % of total value 
added (40 % for sector A). The national wage share then decreases to 68 % (40 
%*0.8 + 60 %*0.6) whereas wage share in each sector remains unchanged. Total 
wage share decreases only because the economy specializes in the sector which 
wage share level is weaker. Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve (2002) underline the 
magnitude of this sectoral shift bias by keeping constant weights of each sector in 
total value added over time. For that, they just calculate the average weight of each 
 sector in value added over the period 1970-1995 and estimate each year the national 
wage share by weighting the sectoral wage shares with this (constant) sectoral 
structure. Their main conclusion is that this bias explains a substantial part of the 
wage share decrease observed in many OECD countries for three decades, and that 
this effect is particularly important in the case of Germany. 
In the next section, we apply this method to French and former West German data 
over the period 1970-2002. Following Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve; we then 
decompose the evolution of national wage share into two distinct effects: one 
sectoral wage share evolution effect, and one sectoral composition evolution effect. 
We also stress out the contribution of each sector to these two effects so as to 
explain precisely why the sectoral composition effect is so high in Germany. 
We suggest two distinct methods to remove the sectoral shift bias: 
- As with Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve (hereinafter referred to as ‘SSM’), 
the sectoral weights are kept constantly at their average value over the period 
we study (1970-2002) (SSM assessment). 
- An alternative method consists in keeping the sectoral structure of the initial 
period4. 
Figures 7 and 8 display the French and West German wage shares after removal of 
the sectoral composition effect (bias). These results are compared with the Askenazy 
assessment5. 
 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
61
63
65
67
69
71
73
75
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
"Askenazy"
assessment
Wage share w ith
sectoral structure of
year 1970
Wage share w ith
average sectoral
structure of years
1970-2002
Figure 7 Wage share in value added: Askenazy and SSM assessments 
Former West Germany, 1970-2002 
4
 Initial period is 1970 for Germany and 1978 for France. For France indeed, we present the 
decomposition of the sectoral composition effect only over the period 1978-2002 (data before 1978 
come from “base 80” for which decomposition by industry is different).
5
 As there is no available data of FISIM by industry, it is impossible to calculate the weight of each 
industry (for the SSM method) using value-added after deduction of the SIFIM (Financial 
intermediation services indirectly measured), which would theoretically correspond to the actual 
definition of value-added. This is the reason why the denominator of our wage share is the value 
added (at basic prices) before deduction the FISIM (“Unbereinigt Bruttowertschöpfung” in German 
national accounts). To get harmonized data, we have taken this same value-added for the calculation 
of wage share by Askenazy method.
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Figure 8 Wage share in value added: Askenazy and SSM assessments 
France, 1970-2002 
 
For France, the 1980 based (for the period 1970-78) and 1995 based (for 1980-2002) 
times series used hitherto unfortunately do not use the same industry classification, 
so that it is quite impossible to build the average sectoral structure of the all period. 
Thus, we have built two different indicators for the SSM assessment: one for period 
1970-78 and one for period 1978-2002. Over the period 1978-2002, the SSM curve is 
1.2 points above Askenazy’s curve. Over the period 1970-1978, the SSM curve is 0.6 
points below Askenazy’s curve. For the full period, our conclusion must be cautious 
the correction induced by SSM method is likely to be pretty low in the French case 
because of the absence of continuous times series. However, the general conclusion 
is that the sectoral composition bias is likely to explain at best 1 point (probably a bit 
less) of wage share decrease over the whole period. 
For West Germany, our results are quite similar to those of Serres, Scarpetta and 
Maisonneuve; nevertheless, the gap between the curve before and after correction of 
the sectoral composition bias is a bit higher with data on West Germany only. By 
attributing the same level to all curves in 1970 (see figure 6), the gap between 
Askenazy and SSM assessments equals 7.8 points of percentage in 1997 and 8.4 
points of percentage in 2002, which is very impressive. Instead of a decreasing trend 
(before correction of sectoral composition bias), we finally get an increasing trend 
after correction. 
Note also that our alternative method to remove the sectoral composition effect 
overestimates a little the results by comparison with the SSM assessment (at least 
until the end of 1990s). Nevertheless, it remains a good estimate of the SSM method, 
since the average gap between these two curves is only of 0.5 points of percentage. 
Let us now identify the contributions of the two underlined effects (sectoral wage 
share evolutions and sectoral composition evolutions) one the one hand, of each 
sector on the other hand, to the variations of national wage share. 
The decomposition of wage share evolutions in two effects has been clearly 
highlighted by Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve in their article (2002):  
 
National Wage Share = WS = 
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Where LC and VA are respectively total labour compensations and value added in 
sector i. So equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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By differentiating this equation over time, we can exhibit two different components: 
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The first term in equation (3) captures the sectoral wage share evolutions effects, the 
second term the sectoral composition effect. 
To identify the contribution of each sector, we need to modify a little this equation (3). 
At this stage an increase of the weight of one sector in total value added just brings 
about a positive sectoral composition effect for this sector. However, we would like to 
have a positive effect if two conditions are fulfilled: on the one hand, the weight of the 
sector increases (resp. decreases) and, on the other hand, the wage share of this 
sector is higher (resp. weaker) than the average wage share of the economy. This is 
the reason why we slightly modify equation (3): in equation (4), the second term 
(sectoral composition effect) is now centred around the average national wage 
share6: 
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Table 1 displays the result we obtain by using equation (4) to decompose the 
evolutions of total wage share between 1970 (initial period) and 2002 (final period) in 
Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
To get equation (4), just note that 1 =∆+ 234 565
798
α . Suppose that wage share is the same in all the 
sectors of the economy (it is then equal to the national average wage share WS). In this case, the 
evolutions of sectoral composition will obviously have no effect on national wage share, which will 
remain constant.
  
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Table 1 Decomposition of wage share variation, Former West Germany, 1970-2002 
	


Global 
Effect 
by Sector 
Sectoral 
Composition 
Effect 
Sectoral 
Wage 
Share  
Effect 
Wage Share 
Variation 
Weight of the 
Sector in Global 
Value Added  
in 1970 
(1) = (2) + (3) (2) (3) = (4) * (5) (4) (5) 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 	
  	  	  	   
Mining and Quarrying  	       
Manufacturing   	       
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply     
   
 

Construction 	 	       
Wholesale and Retail Trade   	      
Restaurants and Hotels  
 	   

 
  
Transports and Storage and Communication 	    	  	
   
Finance and Insurance         
Real Estate and Business Services 	 	       
Community Social and Personal Services     	  	   

Total Economy ﬀ ﬁ ﬃﬂ    ﬁ ﬃ    
Methods: !#"ﬃ$ﬀ%&'() *ﬀ*,+ -".ﬀ'/01%32ﬃ456
 
The last line of this table (“Total Economy”) confirms the main conclusions drown 
from Figure 6: the national wage share decrease of 3.6 points between 1970 and 
2002 is the consequence of two very antagonistic effects: the “sectoral wage share 
evolution” effect has increased of 4.6 points over the period but, at the same time, the 
“sectoral composition evolution” is strongly negative (-8.2 points). Actually, wage 
share would have risen in most sectors of the economy but national wage share has 
however decreased because former West Germany has deeply specialized over the 
period in sectors which wage share was relatively low (this has induced the strong 
negative sectoral composition effect). 
Table 1 allows to identify which evolutions in the productive structure induced this 
composition effect. From this table, it appears that only two sectors explain the bulk 
of this effect: “Manufacturing” (-1.7 points, 20 % of total effect) and, above all, “Real 
estate and Business Services” (-5.8 points), which represents 70 % of the total 
sectoral effect. 
For “Manufacturing”, this negative effect is the consequence, as one could expect, of 
the decreasing weight of this sector in total value added over the period: 
“Manufacturing” accounts for 23.1% of total German value added in 2002 against 
36.6 % in 1970. As manufacturing wage share in 2002 is higher (75.4 %) than 
national wage share (63.1 %), the sectoral effect is negative. 
The sector “Real Estate and Business Services” has been broken down into five 
subsectors in order to identify which ones explain such an important effect7: from this 
decomposition, it appears that the sole “Real Estate, Rental and Leasing” industry 
represents more than eighty percent (82 %) of the total effect over the period 1970-
91. Finally, “Real estate” would explain more than 50 % (almost 60 %) of the total 
sectoral effect over the period 1970-2002. Remember that, in national accounting, 
rents are recorded as consumption by the tenants of a housing service (not as a 
transfer of income) produced by the owner (and so recorded in value added). 
Moreover, the value added of this housing service is estimated by the rent paid by 
7
 Such a decomposition was impossible to lead on former West Germany after 1991 (data 
unavailable); this is the reason why this decomposition has been carried out only over the period 
1970-1991.
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the tenant (this is the reason why the wage share level in this sector is quite low: only 
4.8% on average over the period 1970-2002). The weight of this sector in total value 
added increased a lot over the period (from 6% in 1970 to 12% in 2002)8. As the 
value added of this sector goes primarily to capital remuneration (real estate of the 
owners), the increasing weight of this sector brings about a fall of total wage share 
(rise of the denominator without modification of the numerator); this fall however does 
not come at all from any deterioration of employees bargaining power in firms, as 
Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve had already suggested. 
Note that the SSM assessment does not allow to conclude that “wage share in West 
Germany” did not fall since 1980. The truth is that it did decline; the only thing is that 
wage share did not decline because of some wage austerity. It decreased only 
because of sectoral shift. 
For France, we have seen that the sectoral composition effect was pretty weak over 
the period 1970-2003; nevertheless, this weakness may be the consequence of 
opposite effects (positive or negative) at sectoral level. Because available data over 
the period 1970-78 come from “base 80” which uses a different sectoral 
classification, we concentrate here on period 1978-2003. On table 2, we thus 
compare the decomposition of wage share evolutions between 1978 and 2003 in 
France and Germany (1977-2002 for Germany). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2 Decomposition of wage share variation, Comparison of France and Germany 
France 1978-2003 Former West Germany, 1977-2002 
Global 
effect 
by sector 
Sectoral 
Composition 
Effect 
Sectoral 
Wage Share 
Effect 
Global 
effect 
by sector 
Sectoral 
Composition 
Effect 
Sectoral 
Wage Share 
Effect 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing 
	 
   	  	  	  	 

Manufacturing  	     
 	  
Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply 
	  	 
  
  
Construction (incl. Mining)  	 
   	  	  	 

Wholesale and Retail Trade 	
 
   	
 
   	  
Transports*      	    	 
Finance and Insurance 	   	   	  
Real Estate and Business 
Services** 
	  	
  	 
 	  	  
Community Social and 
Personal Services 
	    	
  ﬃ  
 	 

Total Economy ﬂ    ﬃﬁ  ﬃ     ﬀ 
    Real Estate sector*** 	
  	
  	 	  	   
*Including Storage and Communication for Germany. 
** Including Restaurants and Hotels for both countries, Storage and Communication for France. 
*** Estimated for Germany 
 

We could think that the bulk of this increase is explained by a price effect, related to an increase of 
rents more important than price increase of other products. Our data prove quite the contrary: price 
index of “real estate” increased at the same pace as value added price deflator over the period 1970-
2002 in Germany. Indeed, available data on housing clearly suggest that increase of rents stems from 
a strong volume (maybe quality) effect: higher surface area by inhabitant (higher surface area and 
fewer inhabitant by housing).
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On table 2, we see that sectoral composition bias is quite weaker in France (-1.9 
points of percentage) than in Germany (-7.1 points). This difference is explained by 
two different reasons: on the one hand, and maybe surprisingly, the negative effect of 
“Real estate” sector is twice bigger in Germany (-5.1) than in France (-2.3); on the 
other hand, many sectors in France exhibit a positive sectoral effect which partially 
offset the (prevailing) negative effect: global positive effect equals 1.3 points in 
France against only 0.3 in Germany. At last, we can notice that the wage share 
effect, which is positive (+2.7) in Germany over the period, is strongly negative in 
France (-6.2), especially because wage austerity had been very strong during the 
1980s in this country. 
 
 
5. WAGE RESTRAINT IN GERMANY SINCE 2001 WITHIN THE EURO 
AREA.
Former developments have highlighted the strong sectoral bias in Germany in the 
long run. Our aim is now to deepen the analysis of the fall of the wage share which 
has occurred since 1995, on the national level as well as in the industry – a drop that 
has dramatically accelerated since 2001 – thanks to some larger international 
comparative data. We then propose an interpretation of the noticed evolution.  
 
5.1. Since 2001: a pronounced mark-up effect in Germany. 
 
First, a comparison, extended to the Euro area and the United Kingdom – as an 
example for a country outside the monetary Union –, confirms the singularity of the 
strong fall of the unit wage cost which has occurred in Germany since 2001. 
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Figure 9 Adjusted wage share (usual method) in total value added (at basic price) in the UK, France, 
Germany and the Euro area, 1995-2005 (Sources: Eurostat, own calculations) 
 
According to EUROSTAT data, in the United Kingdom the wage share in the value 
added at factor prices in the whole economy has increased by 2 points of percentage 
since 1995. If one turns one’s attention to the most recent period, since 2000, one 
can see that the real unit labour cost9, remained overall stable in France and Italy. It 
9
 Which includes however probably itself an unequal sectoral bias according to the countries. 
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is therefore the German economy – that accounts for more than a quarter of the Euro 
area GDP –, which has clearly weighed on the global evolution of the EMU. 
 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
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Figure 10 Evolution of real unit labour costs (total economy) in the UK, France, Germany,  
and the Euro area, 2000-2005 (Sources: Eurostat, own calculations) 
 
Secondly, there are two main reasons to focus now on the evolution of the wage 
share in industry alone. The first raison has to do with the price-competitiveness of 
the exports, that is the variation of the unit labour costs10. The second raison is 
related to the effects previously highlighted (increasing part of the employees in total 
employment and the sectoral bias), which are here neutralized. 
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Figure 11 Wage share (= 100 in 1991) in the industry (exclusive of construction), 
 France and Germany, 2000-2005 
 
 
10
 Regarding the competitiveness of the French and German exports, two elements are to be 
considered. First, the main part of competitiveness’ variations between the euro area and the rest of 
the world comes from the fluctuations of the euro exchange rates and not mainly from differences 
between the national unit wage costs (Artus and Fontagné, 2006). Therefore the cost competitiveness 
is especially important within the EMU. Secondly, the main difference between French and German (or 
European) exports relates to the income-elasticity: while that of German exports is high, French 
exports are not very sensitive to a given increase of the external demand (Gaullier and al., 2006). 
  
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Figure 12 Labour compensations (in real terms) and productivity in the industry, 
France and Germany, 1995-2005 
 
Due to the impact of the reunification, the wage share in German industry found only 
in 1997 its level of 1991. It has then increased slightly more quickly than the wage 
share in French industry until 2003. But the underlying factors are quite different in 
both cases as the decomposition of the real unit labour cost shows. In French 
industry the labour compensation per capita has been following more or less the 
productivity in the long run with slight differences in the short run, which explain the 
variation of the real unit labour costs. The growth rate of productivity in German 
industry is lower that of its French counterpart between 1996 and 2002, but it has 
increased at about the same pace since then. Only the long run stagnation of the 
labour compensation per capita in real terms can explain the drop of the wage share 
by 10 points of percentage since 2001, with a very marked “unhooking” of wage costs 
compared to productivity. In a context of a growing decentralization in wage setting 
regimes (Heinbach, 2006), the growth of the nominal wage has been particularly 
weak in the industry as in the whole economy. 
 
 
5.2. A competitive strategy within the euro area. 
 
How can we explain the noted facts? A first grid of interpretation suggests the 
repercussion of German reunification, understood here as a shock on labour costs. 
Within this framework of analysis the “wage restraint” – i.e. a growth of the real labour 
compensation lower than the productivity - in Germany during these last years has 
just been a long run correction. Moreover this wage restraint is to be welcome: it 
makes it possible to increase the demand thanks to the creation of jobs and to 
increased competitiveness. The following increase in the profits is set to boost the 
investment because the curb of the labour costs makes the investment more 
profitable (Sachverständigenrat, 2003, pp.361-377)11. Without discussing here the 
underlying theoretical arguments, we would like to pay attention to the logic and to 
the consequences of this strategy of lasting wage restraint within the EMU. It is a 
matter of fact that, following reunification, the real wages grew faster than productivity 
11
 See also the recommendations of the Sachverständigenrat regarding the wage policy 
(Sachverständigenrat 2006, pp. 459-463). For a critical argument, see Fritsche and alii (2005, pp. 41-
48). 
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in the first part of the nineties in Germany. But the correction was achieved at the 
very beginning of the new century. It is therefore only increased competitiveness that 
can justify the wage restraint after 2001. But what are the results for the whole euro 
area? 
Considering the limited scope of countercyclical fiscal policy under stability and 
growth pact and the fact that the common monetary policy aims at stabilizing inflation 
to a low level for the whole EMU (“one size fits all”), it is well-known that the wage 
policy takes on greater importance as an adjustment variable, i.e. to mitigate adverse 
shocks. In this context, cross-sectional investigations show that, contrary to some 
theoretical predictions, wage restraint has been either unchanged or increased 
following EMU in the bulk of countries and particularly in Germany (Posen and Gould, 
2006) – even if the underlying mechanisms remain the matter of debates. The wages’ 
determinants and the rate of growth of the labour costs however go on to diverge 
within the euro area (Fritz and alii, 2005). Compared to other monetary Unions like 
Germany before the EMU and the United States, country-specific deviations of unit 
labour costs from the rest of the currency union are “more pronounced and more 
persistent” in the EMU (Dullien and Fristche, 2007). These persistent divergences 
can be attributed, on the one hand, to the “South-countries” of the EMU, where wage 
policy is above the recommended benchmark12, and, on the other hand, to Germany 
which has the opposite case. 
The noticed fact in Germany can be characterized as a new “competitive disinflation” 
strategy within the institutional framework of the EMU (Creel and Le Cacheux, 2006). 
This kind of strategy was frequently used in Europe before the EMU: national 
governments used competitive devaluations to improve the competitiveness of their 
national economies. Since the single currency makes the devaluation impossible, the 
same results are reached nowadays by wage moderation, reduction of the costs’ 
production and tax competition. The increase of the VAT in Germany in January 2007 
to make up for the drop in contributions’ rate to unemployment insurance lies within 
the scope of this non-cooperative strategy within the European Monetary Union. This 
policy which aims at increasing the contribution of the balance of goods and services 
to the growth of GDP – until now implemented by the “small” countries of the euro 
area, where the share of the national production absorbed by partners is high – leads 
ineluctably to a non-cooperative equilibrium. From this point of view Germany 
reached its aim with a positive growth contribution of the balance of goods and 
service around 1 point each year from 2001 to 2006 – as previously for year 2007. 
The price to be paid was however high with a sluggish growth in the GDP over this 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 Variation of cost of labor – that is employee compensation per salary earner – should grow like the 
average productivity plus the inflation target of the ECB. See for instance Fritsche and alii (2005). 
  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 Growth rate of real GDP, contributions to growth, unemployment and inflation rates, 
in Germany, United-States and Euro area 
 Germany 
2001-2005 
Euro area 
2001-2005 
USA 
2001-2005 
Germany 
2006 (*) 
Germany 
2007 (*) 
Real GDP, annual growth rate, 
percent 
0,7 1,4 2,6 2,4 1,8 
Growth contribution of domestic 
demand including stocks, 
percentage points 
- 0,3 1,3 3,0 1,4 0,9 
Growth contribution of private 
consumption, percentage points 
0,2 0,8 2,2 0,5 0,2 
Growth contribution of public 
consumption, percentage points 
0,0 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,1 
Growth contribution of gross fixed 
capital formation, percentage points 
-0,4 0,1 0,4 0,7 0,6 
Growth contribution of balance of 
goods and service, percentage 
points 
1,0 0,1 -0,5 1,0 0,9 
Sources: OECD, Forcastings Sachverständigenrat (2006) and own calculations. 
 
 
Does the 2006 recovery of the German economy mean that this strategy has been 
durably successful in the long run? A look at the market share and at the balance of 
goods and services seems to confirm the increase in competitiveness of the German 
economy13. But a more thorough analysis shows that, by assuming that French 
sectoral structure of exports had been the same as the German one14, three quarters 
of the difference in export performance between both countries would have been 
explained by the higher growth of German exports to the EU from 1998 to 2003. This 
fact can be explained by a more dynamic domestic demand in France (and in the rest 
of the euro area) than in Germany (Artus and Fontagné, 2006, pp.31-48). In other 
words, durable and sluggish domestic growth15 might explain why Germany has been 
performing so well overseas. But one may fear that an unchanged wage restraint in 
Germany will continue to be detrimental for France as for the entire euro area, i.e. in 
the long run for Germany itself. 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we have compared income distribution evolutions since 1970 in France 
and former West Germany by removing biases exhibited due to sectoral shifts (de 
Serres, Scarpetta, Maisonneuve, 2002) or to the approximation of the income of 
unincoporated enterprises owners (Askenazy, 2003). Three main results have been 
obtained.  
First, for France, the bias emphasized by Askenazy explains a large part of the 
decrease of wage share (with the usual method) because agriculture remained a 
relatively important sector in this country in 1970. Once this bias has been removed, 
13
 Energy deficit put aside, the surplus of the trade balance was multiplied by two in Germany from 
2000 to 2005 whereas it is remained stable on a low level in France over the same period. 
14
 Note that this sectoral difference between both countries explains less than 10% of the gap between 
French and German exports (see Artus and Fontagné, 2006, p. 35).
15
 0.7% each year in real terms from 2001 to 2005, with a negative contribution of the domestic 
demand.  
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French wage share in 2002 is 2 points below its 1970 level. The sectoral composition 
bias suggested by Serres, Scarpetta and Maisonneuve seems to be pretty weak in 
this country over the period 1970-2003. 
Secondly, for West Germany on the contrary, the “Askenazy bias” is very weak, 
whereas the second one is very strong and completely explains the fall of wage 
share in this country (see figure 1): if sectoral structure in former West Germany had 
remained the same as in 1970, wage share would not have decreased of 4 points but 
increased of 4 points in 2002. Almost 60 % of this sectoral effect stems from the 
growing weight of “Real Estate” sector in total value-added. By comparison with 
Germany, the French sectoral composition bias is far lower because of both a weaker 
“Real estate” effect and, during the same time, a noticeable opposite (positive) 
sectoral effect in many other sectors of the economy. 
At last, biases highlighted above cannot explain the severe decline of wage share for 
some years in Germany: in accordance with recommendations of several German 
experts, Germany has been experiencing a severe wage austerity since 2001 
(especially in the manufacturing industry), which has been here analysed as a 
competitive but non cooperative strategy, mainly within the euro area. 
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